In brief. Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. After a long dispute with Britain, a coup in August 1953, organised with British and American help, restored the shah's power. Its causes and consequences are still debated.
In 1951 the Majlis voted to nationalise Iran’s oil industry, which had been run by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The shah appointed Mohammad Mossadegh prime minister. Mossadegh was a veteran politician and leader of the National Front, and the vote made him a hero to many Iranians and an enemy to the British government.
The dispute
Britain, which owned most of the company, imposed a boycott on Iranian oil and took the case to international courts. Iran’s income fell, and the economy suffered. Negotiations failed. Inside Iran, Mossadegh’s coalition began to split, with disagreements about his methods and the growing influence of the left and of religious leaders. The shah, who had less power than he wanted, was an uneasy partner.
August 1953
In August 1953, an attempt to remove Mossadegh failed, and the shah left the country. Days later, crowds, army units and a plan organised with British and American help brought Mossadegh down. General Fazlollah Zahedi became prime minister, and the shah returned. Mossadegh was tried, sentenced to prison and then kept under house arrest until he died in 1967.
British and American intelligence services were involved in planning and funding the August 1953 coup. This is shown by official and declassified sources, and the United States government has acknowledged its role.
Two readings
The question is what the foreign role meant.
One reading, associated with Abrahamian, emphasises the foreign plot: oil, Cold War fears and a determined British and American campaign overthrew a popular, elected government and set back Iranian democracy. Another reading, found in work edited by Gasiorowski and Byrne, stresses that Mossadegh had lost much of his support at home, that the clergy and part of the army turned against him, and that the outcome depended on Iranian actors as well.
Most historians combine the two: the coup needed foreign planning and local conditions. They differ in how they weigh them.
What followed
After 1953 the shah’s power grew. A new oil agreement in 1954 gave a consortium, including American companies, a major role, while the state kept ownership in principle. The memory of 1953 became an important part of Iranian politics and of Iranian views of the West, and later of US–Iranian relations.
Many Iranians of different political views came to see 1953 as a lesson about foreign interference. How the event is remembered, and by whom, is often as important to politics as the details of what happened.
Notes and sources
- Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (eds), Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse University Press, 2004).
- Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.–Iranian Relations (The New Press, 2013).
- Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton University Press, 1982).
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